REFRESH - Go to Home-Page
It seems from my site meter readings that this is one of the more popular blog entries from my blog being shared via email and saved in favorites, around Staten Island, Brooklyn and New York so this blog entry was UPDATED.
Apparently when I originally wrote this... I didn't consider that the legal kidnapping of my children disguised as a custody/divorce case was, could be, or is larger than what it looks like on paper...
Alternatively, what it looks like when you put all the pieces together... a R.I.C.O case!!
Stupid me thought there would be justice in the courts.
Never did I consider that court employees including attorneys, judges, Secretaries, forensic evaluators and hearing officers would or could engage in R.I.C.O. Duh.. I'm learning my lesson being naieve dosen't work when your dealing with evil forces.
The more I research my case the more I'm convinced it is nothing short of a R.I.C.O. case - here you decide for yourself.
(R.I.C.O. Act ... then if the shoe fits.. what's that they say?) Wear it?
I didn't realize that my own attorneys would sell me out but now that I believe this is a RICO case ... of course they would or they wouldn't ever prevail in their legal professions)
I had no idea that a domestic violence judge Judge Silber, would let my attorney off the hook for an apparent B.S. break down in communication after my attorney demanded that we ask for visitation for me with my children to INCLUDE at all times my abusive estranged husband among many other things and I refused to sign the half assed bullshit motion to modify custody. But hind site being 20/20 now that I believe this is a R.I.C.O. Case I have to believe ... of course she would.. there were so many players before her This apparent RICO case involved to many people to allow my attorney to totally expose it.
Keep in mind the apparent fraud and preclusion of critical evidence (a false ACS case) used by Ms. Catherine Bridge Esq., Ms. Amerose., the late Mr. Mario Accunzo esq., and Hearing Officer Gallet in my estranged husbands custody being over turned.
Keep in mind this is the same estranged husband that has alienated kidnapped the children from me for the last SIX YEARS and refused me ANY CONTACT..
DUH if I thought about it they were kidnapped why would I have contact!
Keep in mind that I have a final and forever Order of Protection, which since his apparent political connections I might as well wipe my (&%$ with it, the police REFUSE TO INVESTIGATE his stalking me. Another DUH! Keep in mind R.I.C.O. then this all makes sense.
UPDATE finished, back to the original blog entry...
I will blog and talk about and demand justice for my family..
I'm sure they would like to put a gag on me..
But while I still have a voice I will do whatever it takes to educate the public on what is happening to families behind closed doors.
FYI mr wonderful is what I call my estranged ex.
I have a My Space account MySpace.com that my estranged husband and his side kick stalk me on, I'd like to share some of the intimidation tactics they are trying to use to silence me.
In responce to this blog,
Current mood: determined
1 NEW!» AggieWhat's up with this? 09 Apr 07 1:42P..
Tomorrow it will be THREE WEEKS since Mr. wonderful (ex) has made it concrete clear for the record that he is stalking me.
Today he felt the need to respond with more psycho babble to my blog dated April 6th, as if anyone wants to hear what he has to say, but nonetheless he feels the need continue his stalking and harassing, despite my asking NUMEROUS times for him to stop, also despite my warning him that I have a valid O.P.
I'm begining to wonder if the political influence/connection it appeared he had, has figured out that my lawyer and I are on to what has been going on in Staten Island, with my case. (Proven with records or the lack thereof) and left him flat on his face to deal with the 200+ pages of a divorce motion.
A divorce motion in which my lawyer makes it clear that we feel all the civil rights violations (Proven in Exhibits A-Z then AA-ZZ) that I have had to endure over the last SIX YEARS may be connected to Supreme Ct Judge Barbara Panepinto, who happens to be married to Joseph Panepinto Director of the CYO, who BTW is my ex's boss and happens to share the same sir name as Aggie Panepinto (Ex's GF).
I am also wondering why it is, that no matter how many times I blog (here or on my Google bloger acount) about the suspicious coincidence with the Panepinto name, Mr wonderful pretends he never read that part of the blog, yet he will try desperately to distract from the meat and potatoes of this case which is the numberous civil rights violations, I feel were set into place because of this possible political connection.
Now another thing that makes ya go hmmmmmmm...
It's been SIXTY SIX days since he's been served with a Divorce action yet he has not answered.
(1) Could it be that his incompetent lawyer refused to stay on with him, given what has been exposed in the divorce papers?
(2) Could it be that he can't find a lawyer stupid enough to take on a case with such insane proven civil rights violations?
(3) Could my lawsuit against the City and ACS have spread thru the system?
(4) Could it be that someone somewhere is concerned that the county I have brough this case to is under Federal investigation?
(5) Could he think I'm stupid enuff to take his bait and arguee with him?
Or (D) all of the above?
They posted this,
i like to know wherre you come up with this carbage. how your mind works. they took your kids away face it thats all you have to do face it. instead you use every excuse in the book like corruption in the courts there is none wake up there is no realtionship with barbara panepinto and me . why dont you call her and ask. you know what let me call her and let her know that her name is all over the computer what do you call that slander.
Posted by Aggie on Tuesday, April 10, 2007 at 5:22 AM
Which inspired me to post this,
Libel and slander Category: News and Politics
It appears that my Stalker estranged husband and his side kick aggie panepinto are misinformed once again...
FACT- AGGIE's Surname is PANEPINTO
FACT- MR WONDERFUL- is or was for over TEN YEARS EMPLOYED
(if that's the proper term for his being paid as a referee)
with the CATHOLIC YOUTH ORGANIZATION aka CYO
FACT- MR JOSEPH PANEPINTO- is or was the DIRECTOR of THE SAME CYO where mr wonderful is or was EMPLOYED
FACT- JUDGE BARBARA PANEPINTO- is or was a JUDGE IN STATEN ISLAND SUPREME COURT and is or was married to CYO DIRECTOR JOSPEH PANEPINTO
FACT- This case was in the Staten Island family court
FACT- ACS (agency for child protective services) and NYC ARE the defendants in a CLAIM BY MS. LOUISE UCCIO AND HER ATTORNEY- FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION and NEGLIGENT MISREPSENTATION derived from a FALSE "SUBSTANTIATED" ACS CASE - wherein LOUISE UCCIO was FALSELY ACCUSED of being a drug addict who attempted suicide, ON JULY 12, 2006 CASE WAS OVERTURNED!
FACT- mr wonderful called ACS NUMEROUS TIMES in 2001- trying to have MS. UCCIO's children taken from her-all but the last one WERE UNFOUNDED and ACS workers PUT IN WRITTING mr wonderfuls claims were NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE!
FACT- mr wonderful's ATTORNEY CATHERINE BRIDGE- was able to LEGALLY KEEP MS. UCCIO's CHILDREN FROM HER- AND HAVE CUSTODY FLIPPED TO mr wonderful WITH LIES -USING A FILED FOR BUT NOT RECIEVED ORDER OF PROTECTION AGAINST MS. UCCIO FOR HER DAUGHTER- ALSO BY USING THE FALSE SUBSTAINCIATED ACS CASE WHICH INDICATED MS. UCCIO WAS DRUG ADDICT WHO ATTEMPTED SUICIDE- THAT WAS HIS TRUMP CARD THAT WAS NEVER TRUE OR REVEALED IN COURT!
FACT- MS. UCCIO LOST CUSTODY WITHOUT BEING ALLOWED TO DEFEND HERSELF AGAINST HEARING OFFICER BONNIE COHEN GALLET, AND MS AMEROSE'S ACCUSATIONS OF DRUGS. IN FACT MS UCCIO WAS DENIED DRUG TESTING, ALSO A FACT MS. UCCIO's VOLUNTARY NEGATIVE HAIR DRUG TEST WAS DISMISSED BY HEARING OFFICER GALLET.
FACT- MS. UCCIO AND HER CHILDREN'S CIVIL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN TRAMPLED ON!
FACT- mr wonderful and his side kick aggie panepinto HAVE NOT ENCOURAGED ANY CONTACT BETWEEN THE CHILDREN AND MS. UCCIO. IT HAS BEEN FIVE YEARS SINCE THEY HAVE HAD A VISIT WITH THEIR MOTHER!
FACT- The children HAVE BEEN TURNED AGAINST MS. UCCIO SINCE 2002.
FACT- mr wonderful is unable to show respect for the childrens mother MS. UCCIO.
FACT- mr wonderful's inability to respect or even tollerate MS. UCCIO along with mr wonderful's NEED FOR REVENGE has led to an ESTRANGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOTHER AND CHILDREN!
FACT- EVERY WORD OF THIS IS IN A 200+ PAGE DIVORCE ACTION served upon mr wonderful on february 2, 2007 which mr wonderful has not answered -45 days and counting.
MY OPINION- mr wonderful isn't smart enough to have pulled this off without someone's guideance and or help.
MY OPINION- mr wonderful underestimated me again, and never thought I would put 2 (aggie-panepinto) and 2 (Jospeh-panepinto) and 2 (Barbara panepinto) and 2 (CYO) and 2 (civil rights violations against my children and I ) together, and see these as possible red flags
FACTS- A PSYCHIATRIST and A PSYCHOLIGIST and A THERAPIST' as well as my LAWYER's OPINION- "ALL THESE FACTS ADD UP TO A VERY SUSPICIOUS COINCIDENCE." and "EGREGIOUS CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS"
FACT- I have always stated facts and let anyone reading it or hearing it decide for themself.
FACT- mr wonderful and his sidekick ARE STALKING ME, BREAKING A VALID ORDER OF PROTECTION!
MY OPINION- There isn't a lawyer on this planet that would take mr wonderful's case and attempt to defend him, especially in westchester where the FBI are still investigating corruption in the courts.
MY OPINION- All these FACTS have put mr wonderful into a corner and he feels trapped, and this "IN MY OPINION" is why he appears to be out of control, and why I fear for my life!
Slander and libel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
- Slander and libel
In law, defamation is the communication of a statement that makes a false claim, expressly stated or implied to be factual, that may harm the reputation of an individual, business, product, group, government or nation. Most jurisdictions allow legal actions, civil and/or criminal, to deter various kinds of defamation and retaliate against criticism.
The common law origins of defamation lie in the torts of slander (harmful statement in a transitory form, especially speech) and libel (harmful statement in a fixed medium, especially writing but also a picture, sign, or electronic broadcast), each of which gives a common law right of action.
"Defamation" is the general term used internationally, and is used in this article where it is not necessary to distinguish between "slander" and "libel". Libel and slander both require publication. The fundamental distinction between libel and slander lies solely in the form in which the defamatory matter is published. If the offending material is published in some fleeting form, as by spoken words or sounds, sign language, gestures and the like, then this is slander. If it is published in more durable form, for example in written words, film, compact disc and the like, then it is considered libel.
"Libel" comes from Latin : libellus ("little book")
Even if a statement is derogatory, there are circumstances in which such statements are permissible in law.
Libel is studied in forensics. In many, though not all, legal systems, statements presented as fact must be false to be defamatory. Proving a defamatory statement to be true is often the best defense against a prosecution for libel.
Statements of opinion that cannot be proven true or false will likely need to apply some other kind of defense. The use of the defense of justification has dangers, however. If the defendant libels the plaintiff and then runs the defense of truth and fails, he may be said to have aggravated the harm.
In some systems, however, notably the Philippines and the Canadian province of Quebec, truth alone is not a defense. It is also necessary in these cases to show that there is a well-founded public interest in the specific information being widely known, and this may be the case even for public figures.
Public interest is generally not "that which the public is interested in," but rather that which is in the interest of the public. 
See also: Substantial truth
Privilege and malice
Privilege provides a complete bar and answer to a defamation suit, though conditions may have to be met before this protection is granted.
There are two types of privilege in the common law tradition:
"Absolute privilege" has the effect that a statement cannot be sued on as defamatory, even if it was made maliciously; a typical example is evidence given in court (although this may give rise to different claims, such as an action for malicious prosecution or perjury) or statements made in a session of the legislature (known as 'Parliamentary privilege' in Commonwealth countries).
"Qualified privilege" may be available to the journalist as a defense in circumstances where it is considered important that the facts be known in the public interest; an example would be public meetings, local government documents, and information relating to public bodies such as the police and fire departments. Qualified privilege has the same effect as absolute privilege, but does not protect statements that can be proven to have been made maliciously.
Similar but different delicts and torts
Some jurisdictions have a separate tort or delict of "verbal injury," "intentional infliction of emotional distress," or "convicium," involving the making of a statement, even if truthful, intended to harm the claimant out of malice; some have a separate tort or delict of "invasion of privacy" in which the making of a true statement may give rise to liability: but neither of these comes under the general heading of "defamation". Some jurisdictions also have the tort of "false light", in which a statement may be technically true, but so misleading as to be defamatory. There is also, in almost all jurisdictions, a tort or delict of "misrepresentation", involving the making of a statement which is untrue even though not defamatory; thus if a surveyor states that a house is free from the risk of flooding, he or she has not defamed anyone, but may still be liable to someone who purchases the house in reliance on this statement.
 Criminal libel
Many nations have criminal penalties for defamation in some situations, and different conditions for determining whether an offense has occurred. For example, in Zimbabwe, "insulting the President" is, by statute, (Public Order and Security Act 2001) a criminal offense. The European Court of Human Rights has in some instances placed restrictions on libel laws by reason of the freedom of expression provisions of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. An important example is Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407. Lingens was fined for publishing in a Vienna magazine comments about the behavior of the Austrian Chancellor, such as 'basest opportunism', 'immoral' and 'undignified'. Under the Austrian criminal code the only defense was proof of the truth of these statements. Lingens could not prove the truth of these value judgments. The European Court of Human Rights stated that a careful distinction needed to be made between facts and value judgments/opinions. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The facts on which Lingens founded his value judgments were not disputed; nor was his good faith. Since it was impossible to prove the truth of value judgments, the requirement of the relevant provisions of the Austrian criminal code was impossible of fulfilment and infringed article 10 of the Convention.
Origins of defamation law
In most early systems of law, verbal defamations were treated as a criminal or quasi-criminal offense, its essence lying not in pecuniary loss, which may be compensated by damages, but in the personal insult which must be atoned for: a vindictive penalty coming in the place of personal revenge. By the law of the Twelve Tables, the composition of scurrilous songs and gross noisy public affronts were punished by death. Minor offenses of the same class seem to have found their place under the general conception of injuria, which included ultimately every form of direct personal aggression which involved abuse or insult.
In the later Roman jurisprudence, from which many of modern laws descend, verbal defamations are dealt with in the edict under two heads. The first comprehended defamatory and injurious statements made in a public manner (convicium contra bonos mores). In this case the essence of the offense lay in the unwarrantable public proclamation. In such a case the truth of the statements was no justification for the unnecessarily public and insulting manner in which they had been made. The second head included defamatory statements made in private, and in this case the offense lay in the imputation itself, not in the manner of its publication. The truth was therefore a sufficient defense, for no man had a right to demand legal protection for a false reputation. Even belief in the truth was enough, because it took away the intention which was essential to the notion of injuria.
The law thus aimed at giving sufficient scope for the discussion of a man's character, while it protected him from needless insult and pain. The remedy for verbal defamation was long confined to a civil action for a monetary penalty, which was estimated according to the significance of the case, and which, although vindictive in its character, doubtless included practically the element of compensation. But a new remedy was introduced with the extension of the criminal law, under which many kinds of defamation were punished with great severity. At the same time increased importance attached to the publication of defamatory books and writings, the libri or libelli famosi, from which we derive our modern use of the word libel; and under the later emperors the latter term came to be specially applied to anonymous accusations or pasquils, the dissemination of which was regarded as particularly dangerous, and visited with very severe punishment, whether the matter contained in them were true or false.
 English law
 Development of English defamation law
Modern libel and slander laws as implemented in many but not all Commonwealth nations, in the United States, and in the Republic of Ireland, are originally descended from English defamation law.
The earlier history of the English law of defamation is somewhat obscure. Civil actions for damages seem to have been tolerably frequent so far back as the reign of Edward I (1272–1307). There was no distinction drawn between words written and spoken. When no pecuniary penalty was involved such cases fell within the old jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which were only finally abolished in the eighteenth century. It seems, to say the least, uncertain whether any generally applicable criminal process was in use.
The crime of scandalum magnatum, spreading false reports about the magnates of the realm, was established by statutes, but the first fully reported case in which libel is affirmed generally to be punishable at common law is one tried in the Star Chamber in the reign of James I. In that case no English authorities are cited except a previous case of the same nature before the same tribunal; the law and terminology appear to be taken directly from Roman sources, with the insertion that libels tended to a breach of the peace; and it seems probable that not very scrupulous tribunal had simply found it convenient to adopt the very stringent Roman provisions regarding the libelli famosi without paying any regard to the Roman limitations. From that time we find both the criminal and civil remedies in full operation.
 English admiralty law
In admiralty law, a libel was the equivalent of a civil lawsuit. The plaintiff was referred to as the "libellant". The verb "to libel" means "to sue [in admiralty]". Similar terminology was used in the United States legal system. The term has been rendered obsolete by the merger of the admiralty courts with tribunals of general jurisdiction and the adoption of simplified rules of civil procedure that specify "one form of action" for all claims.
 Modern law
English law allows actions for libel to be brought in the High Court for any published statements which are alleged to defame a named or identifiable individual or individuals in a manner which causes them loss in their trade or profession, or causes a reasonable person to think worse of him, her or them.
A statement can include an implication. A large photograph of Tony Blair above a headline saying "Corrupt Politicians" might be held to be an allegation that Tony Blair was personally corrupt.
The allowable defenses against libel are:
Justification: the defendant proves that the statement was true. If the defense fails, a court may treat any material produced by the defense to substantiate it, and any ensuing media coverage, as factors aggravating the libel and increasing the damages.
Fair Comment: the defendant shows that the statement was a view that a reasonable person could have held, even if they were motivated by dislike or hatred of the plaintiff.
Privilege: the defendant's comments were made in Parliament or under oath in court of law or were an accurate and neutral report of such comments. There is also a defense of 'qualified privilege' under which people, who are not acting out of malice, may claim privilege for fair reporting of allegations which if true were in the public interest to be published. The leading modern English case on qualified privilege in the context of newspaper articles which are claimed to defame a public figure is now Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd and Others, 1999 UKHL 45, and the privilege has been widened by Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe 2006 UKHL 44, which has been described as giving British newspapers protections similar to the US First Amendment.
An offer of amends - typically a combination of correction, apology and/or financial compensation - is a barrier to litigation in the courts.
The 2006 case of Keith-Smith v Williams confirmed that discussions on the Internet were public enough for libel to take place.
 Burden of proof on the defendant
In most legal systems the courts give the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. In criminal law, he or she is presumed innocent until the prosecution can prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; whereas in civil law, he or she is presumed innocent until the plaintiff can show liability on a balance of probabilities. However, the common law of libel contains a kind of reverse-onus feature: a defamatory statement is presumed to be false unless the defendant can prove its truth. In New York Times v Sullivan (376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964)), the United States Supreme Court changed this traditional feature of the common law with respect to public figures, and ruled that in cases where a public figure was libelled the burden of proof would be on the libeled person (the plaintiff). Furthermore, to collect compensatory damages, a public official or public figure must prove actual malice (knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
A private individual must only prove negligence (not using due care) to collect compensatory damages. In order to collect punitive damages, all individuals must prove actual malice. The definition of "public figure" has varied over the years.
The English laws on libel have traditionally favored the plaintiffs. A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights (in the so-called "McLibel case") held that, on the (exceptional) facts of that case, the burden on the defendants in the English courts was too high. However, it is unlikely that the case will provoke any considerable change in substantive English law, despite strong academic criticism of the current position.
In 1990, McDonald's Restaurants sued Morris & Steel (called the McLibel case) for libel. The original case lasted seven years, making it the longest-running court action in English history. Beginning in 1986, London Greenpeace, a small environmental campaigning group, distributed a pamphlet entitled What's wrong with McDonald's: Everything they don't want you to know. The pamphlet claimed that the McDonald's corporation sells unhealthy food, exploits its work force, practices unethical marketing of its products towards children, is cruel to animals, needlessly uses up resources and creates pollution with its packaging and is responsible for destroying the South American rain forests. Although McDonald's won two hearings, the widespread public opinion against them turned the case into a matter of embarrassment for the company. McDonald's announced that it has no plans to collect the £40,000 it was awarded by the courts, and offered to pay the defendants to drop the case.
Defamation law in the United States is much less plaintiff-friendly than its counterparts in European and the Commonwealth countries.
This is because the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives strong protection to freedom of expression, which arose from the tradition of dissent in the American Revolution.
For most of the history of the United States, constitutional protections of freedom of speech had no impact on the traditional common law of defamation inherited from the English legal system.
This changed with the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, in which the
Supreme Court of the United States announced constitutional restrictions to state defamation law. The court held that where a public official was defamed, the plaintiff had to prove not just that an untruthful statement was made, but also that it was made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. The "actual malice" standard was subsequently extended to public figures in general, and even to private figure plaintiffs seeking punitive or presumptive damages.
One very important distinction today is that European and Commonwealth jurisdictions adhere to a theory that every publication of a defamation gives rise to a separate claim, so that a defamation on the Internet could be sued on in any country in which it was read, while American law only allows one claim for the primary publication.
In the United States, a comprehensive discussion of what is and is not libel or slander is difficult, because the definition differs between different states, and under federal law. Some states codify what constitutes slander and libel together into the same set of laws. Some states have criminal libel laws on the books, though these are old laws which are very infrequently prosecuted.
Most defendants in defamation lawsuits are newspapers or publishers, which are involved in about twice as many lawsuits as are television stations. Most plaintiffs are corporations, businesspeople, entertainers and other public figures, and people involved in criminal cases, usually defendants or convicts but sometimes victims as well. Almost all states do not allow defamation lawsuits to be filed if the allegedly defamed person is deceased. No state allows the plaintiff to be a group of people.
In the various states, whether by case law or legislation, there are generally several "privileges" that can get a defamation case dismissed without proceeding to trial. These include the allegedly defamatory statement being one of opinion rather than fact; or being "fair comment and criticism", as it is important to society that everyone be able to comment on matters of public interest. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the opinion privilege outright and has declined to hold that the "fair comment" privilege is a Constitutional imperative.
[After Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), applied the standard publisher/distributor test to find an online bulletin board liable for post by a third party, Congress specifically enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) to reverse the Prodigy findings and to provide for private blocking and screening of offensive material. §230(c) states that "that no provider or user of an interactive computer shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider," thereby providing forums immunity for statements provided by third parties. Thereafter, cases such as Zeran v American Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), and Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998), have demonstrated that although courts are expressly uneasy with applying §230, they are bound to find providers like AOL immune from defamatory postings. This immunity applies even if the providers are notified of defamatory material and neglect to remove it, due to the fact that provider liability upon notice would likely cause a flood of complaints to providers, would be a large burden on providers, and would have a chilling effect on freedom of speech on the Internet.]
In November of 2006 the California Supreme Court ruled that 47 USC § 230(c)(1) does not permit web sites to be be sued for libel that was written by other parties.